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1. Introduction 
   The major concern of this paper is pricing policy by firms in the framework 
of spatial competition. Most of the literature on spatial competition do not 
consider the choice of pricing strategies. Pricing policy is usually predetermined 
there. For example, among others, Hotelling (1929) assumed mill pricing while 
Hoover (1937) supposed spatially discriminatory pricing. However, it is the 
profit-maximizing firms that determine the pricing strategy, i.e., the pricing 
strategy isnot exogenously given, but should be endogenously determined within 
a model. 
   Taking account of the firms' choice of pricing strategies, we study the 
impacts of cost differences on the structure of industries. In reality, mill pricing 
predominates in some industries while discriminatory pricing prevails in other 
industries. This may be ascribed to the differences intransportation costs, 
marginal costs, or fixed costs as explained later in this paper. Furthermore, we 
examine reasons for the difference in the number of firms between i dustries, and 
discuss prospective changes in the industrial structure. 
   We also conduct welfare analysis. By calculating the social total costs, we 
obtain the optimum number of firms, and compare it with the equilibrium number 
of firms. It should be noted that he number of firms in physical space can be 
interpreted as the number of varieties in characteristics space. So, our analysis is 
applicable to the case of horizontal differentiation f product specifications. 
   The organization ofthis paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe the 
model, and explain three kinds of spatial arrangements of pricing strategies. In 
Section 3, examining sustainability ofeach equilibrium strategy, we compute 
dominant strategies for all parameter values. In Section 4, regarding the number 
of firms as an endogenous variable, we investigate he long run equilibrium, and 
compare it with the social optimum. In Section 5, we analyze the transition in the
spatial arrangement of pricing strategies by changing a parameter value. Section 
6 concludes the paper.
2. The Model 
    There are n firms producing an identical good. For a moment, n is assumed 
to be fixed, but in the later sections, it is endogenously determined by the zero 
profit condition under free entry. It is assumed that n is large enough so that no 
fraction problem arises. Firms choose ither mill pricing or discriminatory 
pricing. 
    Consumers are uniformly distributed over the unit-circumference of a circle 
with the density normalized to one, and their location is denoted by xE [0,1]. 
Each consumer purchases one unit of the good from a firm offering the lowest 
full price. The full price is defined by the mill price plus transportation cost in 
the case of mill pricing, and defined by the delivered price in the case of 
discriminatory pricing. The transportation cost is assumed to be a quadratic 
function of distance with the identical coefficient of c. It is incurred by 
consumers inthe mill pricing case, and by firms in the discriminatory pricing 
case. The transaction costs for resale of goods between consumers are 
prohibitively costly. The marginal costs of production are f ' in the mill pricing 
case and f m in the discriminatory pricing case, and the fixed cost of entry is F. . 
    Each firm simultaneously chooses its location on the circumference of a 
circle in the first stage,, and simultaneously elects apricing strategy and a price 
(single mill price or delivered price schedule) in the second stage. We thus seek 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We focus only on symmetric equilibrium due 
to mathematical tractability although asymmetric equilibrium analysis is 
important as pointed out by Tabuchi and Thisse (1993). 
    In this section, we consider the case of the fixed number of firms. Let us
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denote the profit of firm i by n;(zj z,±1), where z, is the price of a good purchasing 
from firm i, and z;tl is that purchasing from the two neighboring firms at location 
z, 1. If firm i chooses discriminatory pricing, then we set z; pd(x); and if firm i 
selects mill pricing, then we set z; pm. These two price variables will be defined 
in the next two subsections. 
2a. Discriminatory pricing 
   If each firm chooses the discriminatory pricing strategy, the price schedule 
of firm i is set equal to the second lowest level of the delivery costs 
(transportation cost plus marginal production cost) among all firms, which is 
expressed as 
         pd(x)=c(x-x;-1)2+fd for x E[(x1-1+xi)/2, x1]~ 
= C (X - x. 2 + d for x E x. x. + x. / 2 . (1) 
Note that given the symmetry of cost structures, the market boundaries are the 
midpoints between two neighboring firms. 
   For each location x, firm i has to pay the delivery cost and the marginal 
cost: c(x - x; )2 + f d for x e [(x;_, + x;) / 2, (x;+, + x;) / 2]. Hence, the profit of firm i 
is given by 
       d d f
(' xj+1-xt-1)12 2 f(' xt+l-xt-1)12 2 f(x,-xi-,)/2 2 (xi+1-xi)/2 2  ~c;(p jp)=cx dx+cx dx-J cxdc=~ cxd -F                      ,-x,-1)12 x,+1-xi)1  0 0 
            (xi+1 - xi-1) [C(x
i+l - x1)(x1 - xi-1)] - F (2) 
           4 ' 
where pd pd(x). It is not difficult o show that (2) is maximized at x.*= 
(x;+1+xi_1)/2, Vi. This midpoint location is a consequence of the firms' behavior 
that hey locate as far as possible ach other to relax fierce price competition. 
Substituting x.* into (2), and using x;+1 xi _1=2/n due to symmetry, we can simplify 
the profit function of each discriminatory pricing firm: 
                    7ri (pd 1 pd) = C(xi+1 - xi-1)3 - F 
                          16
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   Differentiating (4) with respect top;, and employing Theorem 6 in 
Economides (1989), we have a symmetric equilibrium ill price 
                      pm = 4+1", 
                          n 
and the profit 
                   ;r,(pmlpt)= 3 -F,
n both of which are the same for all firms. 
2c. MD pricing
                    c (3) 
                         2n3 
In Figure 1, the shaded area is equal to the profit of (3). 
2b. Mill pricing 
   Consider the next case that each firm chooses the mill pricing strategy. Let 
b; be the market boundary between firm i and firm i+1. Since the marginal 
consumer locating at b; is indifferent between i and i+ 1 in buying a good, the two 
full prices should be equated as: 
             Pi + c(b, - x;)2= A+, + c(x;+~ - b, )2 
or 
                          ( 2 2)                                p;+i -A +C x;+,-x;
                               2c(xi+1-xi) 
Figure 2 illustrates the situation. The profit is then given by
(5)
   Finally, consider the case that odd-number fi ms choose the mill pricing 
strategy while even ones -choose the discriminatory pricing strategy. The number 
of firms n is large enough and is even. We call it MD pricing. 
    The odd-number fi ms are sandwiched between even-number firms whose 
price schedule isgiven by (1). Let b; be the market boundary as defined in the 
preceding subsection, and pmd be the mill price of firm i, which is odd. Equating 
the full prices, we have
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           pmd -f d +c(x2 -x~ I) and b _ fd _ pmd +c(x'+'2 -x2')
i 
        bi-I -
2c(x, - xi-I) -                                                 2c(xi+I - xi ) 
The odd-number firm maximizes its profit with respect toits mill price as 
follows: 
             maxi ze 7li(pmd Ip ) = (pmd -fm)(bi -bi_I)-F. 
Computing the first-order condition for maximum, weobtain the mill price 
                  pmd _ c(xi+I - xi)(xi - xi-I) + f d + f m (6) 
                      2 2 
Using (6) and the (local) maximizer x;*=(x;+1+xi_1)/2, the profit of each firm is 
then given by 
               gi(pmdlpd)_ [c+(fd-fm)n2]2 -~' (7) 
                               4cn 
   On the other hand, given the mill pricing of (6) by odd-number fi ms, the 
price schedule of even-number firms is the same as (1), and its profit is shown to 
be 
                       d _ [3c-(fd -f m)n2,2 -F .                ,(p Ip ) 8
cn ,3 
3. Sustainability of equilibrium 
   Let us investigate he sustainability of equilibrium. 
3a. Discriminatory pricing 
   Suppose that every firm takes discriminatory pricing but one firm changes 
its strategy to mill pricing. The mill price and the profit of its firm should be 
identical to (6) and (7). The sustainability condition is then given by 
                         Ir                      i(PI lpd)_<Ir                   i(polpd)• (8) 
Using (3) and (7), inequality (8) is shown to be equivalent to
              fd <fm 
                  or l/2 (9) 
                fd >fm and n< (~-1)c -n .                             - fd _ fm 1 
3b. Mill pricing 
   Next, consider the situation that every firm takes mill pricing but one firm 
changes its strategy todiscriminatory p icing. The profit of its firm is computed 
as: 
                 ~~ (pd spin [2c (f d - J )n2]2 _ F. 
                               2cn 
The sustainability condition is 
                          2r                  '(pd Ipm) < " (pmI pm), 
which is equivalent to 
                                                    i/2
              f d > f m and n > (2 ff)c - n . 10                               fd - fm 3 () 
3c. MD pricing 
   Finally, consider the sustainability condition when odd-number fi ms 
choose mill pricing while even ones choose discriminatory pricing. From 
subsection 3a, a fum surrounded by two discriminatory pricing firms selects mill 
pricing when 
                            ~ (Pd(pd )                    ,r(pmd(pd)? 7r 
or 
                      fd>fm and n>_n,, (11) 
which is the same as (8) except the direction of inequality. 
   A firm surrounded by two mill pricing firms with price pmd would select 
discriminatory pricing only if 
                        )r 
                     




                        pmmd _ 3C + f d + 3f 
                              4n2 4 
is the best reply against pmd. 
   This sustainability condition is equivalent to 
           fd > fm and :5 (3(3_21)c)"2                                                      =_ n2 ' 
                            f _fm 
It should be noticed that nl<n2<n3. 
3d. Comparisons 
   Summarizing the results of (9), (10), (11) and (12), we can classify the 
cases in accordance with the number of firms as compared to the parameter 
values, and establish the following.
(1 )
Proposition 1 
(i) When, f d <f n, each firm takes the discriminatory pricing strategy. 
(ii) When f d>f n, 
   (a) if nE(0, n1], each firm takes the discriminatory pricing strategy. 
   (b) if nE [ni, n2], each firm takes the MD pricing strategy. 
   (c) if nE [n3, +ao), each firm takes the mill pricing strategy. I
   Several implications are drawn from Proposition 1. In the first place, the 
discriminatory pricing is likely to take place. It prevails when the marginal cost 
of the discriminatory pricing firms (f is lower than that of the mill pricing ones 
(f"). Moreover, it prevails even when the former marginal cost is higher insofar 
as the number of firms n is small, and/or the transportation cost c is large. 
1 In addition to the above three kinds of spatial rrangements of pricing strategies, there may 
exist other arrangements when  is in the vicinity ofn2 or n3. For example, it isan equilibrium 
that firms i=3k take mill pricing, and firms i=3k+1 and 3k+2 take discriminatory pricing, where k 
is the natural number.
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Roughly speaking, firms tend to adopt he discriminatory pricing strategy so long 
as the marginal costs between the two are not so different. 
   Second, comparing (5) with (3), we know that he profit of mill pricing is 
always greater than that of discriminatory pricing. From Proposition 1, when n is 
small, each firm takes discriminatory pricing, leading to a smaller profit than the 
mill pricing case. As a result, each firm falls into Pareto inferior state in 
equilibrium like prisoners' dilemma. This is a similar finding by Thisse and 
Vives (1988). 
   Finally, since n1, n2 and n3 are positively related to the transportation cost 
rate c, we can say as follows. As the transportation cost gets small and/or the 
number of firms gets large, the MD pricing emerges, and is replaced by the mill 
pricing in the end. We may infer from this that decreasing transportation cost 
together with diminishing entry barriers would lead to the change from the 
discriminatory strategy to the mill pricing strategy.
4. Long run number of firms and social optimum 
4a. Long run equilibrium number of firms 
   If free entry is allowed, and the profit becomes zero in the long run 
equilibrium, then the zero profit condition determines the number of firms n 
endogenously. 
   In the discriminatory pricing case, setting the profit of (3) equal to zero, we 
have the equilibrium number of firms as 
                                              1/3
                         nd- C (13) 
                       2F 
In the mill pricing case, setting (5) to zero, the equilibrium number of firms is 
                                           1/3 
                         n"' _ (14) 
F
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In the MD pricing case, setting (7) to zero, we have two positive solutions for n. 
However, since the larger one does not satisfy the constraint of b,-b, -, E [0,2/n], 
the smaller one is chosen as a unique quilibrium, which we denote
                             n=n'"d. (15) 
Note that nd<nmd<nm can be shown. 
4b. Social optimum number of firms 
    The social optimum is obtained by minimizing the sum of the total 
transportation costs, the total fixed costs, and the total marginal costs of 
production. We therefore formulate as to 
                                    1/2n        minimize T C(n) =2n f o cx2dx + nF+ min (f d ,f m).                                        (16) 
.Solving this yields 
                                             I/3 
                        n° = C (17) 
                        6F 
And, the pricing strategy with a lower marginal cost of production should be 
chosen. 
4c. Welfare Comparisons 
   From (13), (14), (15) and (17), we confirm that 
                               n° <nd <nmd <nt. 
Hence, as in Salop (1979), we can state the following: 
Proposition 2
    Whatever p icing equilibrium isattained, the equilibrium number of firms is 
too large as compared to the social optimum one. 
   In particular, the equilibrium number of firms is 82% larger than the 
optimum one in the mill pricing case (Economides, 1989), and 44% larger in the 
discriminatory pricing case. One may therefore say that here xist too many 
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retail firms in the actual urban areas. 
   Next, let us compare the social total cost TC(n) of each pricing case by 
substituting (13), (14) and (17) into (16). Straightforward calculations yield 
                                    2/3 
                 TC(nd) =7-2 C113F2/3 + fd' 
                    12 
                TC(nm) =13 C1/3F2/3 + f m 
                    12 ' 
                                  2/3 
                TC(n°) _ 6 C1/3F2/3 +min(f d,f m). 
4 
   Directly comparing the social total costs of the two equilibria, we obtain the 
following:
Remark 1 
   The mill pricing is more efficient than the discriminatory pricing when 
cp> cpo, and the reverse is true when cp< go, where 
                 fd _ fm 13-7.22/3 
                  C1/3F2/3 and PO = 12 = 0.157 .
   Consider the parameter range of qpE (0, (po). Since (p is positive, the marginal 
cost of discriminatory pricing f ' is higher than that of mill pricing f 'n. 
Nevertheless, the discriminatory pricing is socially more desirable than the mill 
pricing. This is because the smaller number of firms reduces the sum of the fixed 
costs in the discriminatory case in this parameter range. That is, the effect of the 
higher marginal costs is dominated by the effect of the lower total fixed costs. 
   Suppose that he marginal costs are relatively small and negligible as 
compared to the fixed cost and the transportation cost. Then, we can 
approximately say that he social total cost is 12% higher in the discriminatory 
pricing equilibrium than that in the optimum, and 31 % higher in the mill pricing
10
equilibrium than that in the optimum.
    The next analysis is on consumers' surplus. Since consumers' demand for 
the good is inelastic here, the change in the full price is a direct measure of 
consumers' surplus. Interestingly, the following remark holds in each pricing 
equilibrium.
Remark 2 
   The social total cost of (16) is equal to the total (and average) full price, 
which is incurred by consumers.
Proof 
(a) Discriminatory pricing 
   Due to the free entry condition, the profit is zero. Put it differently, the 
total revenue is equal to the total costs of the firms: 
           2n f l'n (cx2 + fd )dc = 2n f U2n (cx2 + fd )dc + nF. (18) 
                       v2n o 
Now, the RHS of (18) is the same as the social total cost of (16), and the LHS of 
(18) is the total (or average) full price. 
(b) Mill pricing 
    Due to the free entry condition of zero profit, we have
                             1•p'"=1.f'+nF. 
Using (19), the social total cost of (16) is rewritten as 
             TC(n) =2nf 112n cx2dx + nF+ fd = 2n f 112n cx2dx + p"', 
                               0 0 
in which the RHS is the total (and average) full price. 
(c) MD pricing 
   This is the mixed case between (a) and (b), and is similarly shown. 
                           11
(19)
•
   Note that since the demand ensity is normalized to one here, the total cost 
(price) is the same as the average cost (price). From Remark 2, we can say the 
similar thing as Remark 1: the mill pricing is more desirable for consumers than 
the discriminatory pricing when p~po, and the latter is more desirable when (9<90. 
The desirability means the low full price from a viewpoint of consumers' surplus.
5. Transition of long run equilibrium 
   From Proposition 1together with (13)-(15), we have the following set of 
long run equilibrium conditions: 
   (1) discriminatory pricing is stable if lpE (-oo, 92]; 
   (2) MD pricing is stable if q [92,93]; 
   (3) mill pricing is stable if VE [Sp1,+oo); 
                                               10+6~ 2/3 where V,-=2--,f2-=-O.586, (02-2 ,3 ('~f2- -1)~-_0.658, rp3=3(3-2-12-) 7 0.983 
   Examining the above, we can classify the long run equilibria nd establish 
the following proposition.
Proposition 3 
  (a) If -oo<(p-<qpi, each firm takes the discriminatory pricing strategy. 
  (b) If cp1<-rp-<cp2, ea h firm takes the discriminatory ormill pricing strategy. 
  (c) If V2<cp<rp3, each firm takes the MD or mill pricing strategy. 
  (d) If V3<Sp<+oo, each firm takes the mill pricing strategy. 
Figure 3 illustrates these four cases.2
2 In addition, as mentioned in footnote 1, there may exist other spatial arrangements such as mill 
pricing for firms i=3k and discriminatory pricing for firms i=3k+1 and 3k+2.
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    From Remark 1 and Proposition 3, we observe the difference between 
market equilibrium and social optimum in the parameter range of cpE ((o, Sp1). 
Each firm chooses discriminatory pricing in equilibrium although mill pricing is 
more desirable for society as a whole. This is a so-called market failure. It is 
intuitively explained as follows. Since the marginal costs between the two 
pricings do not differ much within this parameter range, the relative disadvantage 
of the discriminatory pricing is not so big. However, the discriminatory pricing 
is more flexible in that it can vary the delivered price for each location. Hence, 
the discriminatory pricing becomes a dominant strategy in spite of its small 
handicap in the marginal cost. 
    We can read the impacts of the parameters on the pricing strategies from 
Proposition 3. The mill pricing strategy prevails for a large value of cp, which 
corresponds tosmall values of c and F and a large difference of f 1 f".3 The 
impact of the difference fl-fl on pricing strategy isstraightforward, but that of c 
and F are not. So, let us investigate economic mplications of the two parameters 
below. 
   In deciding pricing strategies, firms compare the equilibrium ill price 
(pm=c/n2+f fl) with the marginal cost of discriminatory pricing firms (/') because 
these two values determine the market boundaries. The parameters c and n are 
related to the former value, but not the latter one. This means first that as the 
transportation cost rate c gets small, the mill price pm decreases. On the other 
hand, the cost structure of the discriminatory pricing firms remains unchanged. 
As a result, the mill pricing strategy becomes relatively advantageous, leading to 
its dominance. Second, when the entry cost F becomes small, entry would easily
3 We can infer that he prevalence of mill pricing in the real world is attributed o high fd, low 
f ~", low c, and low F.
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take place. This increases the number of firms n, which indirectly contributes to
a decrease inpm since pm=c/n2+f l holds. Therefore, a decrease inF as well as a 
decrease inc leads to prevalence ofthe mill pricing strategy. 
    We may say that when these costs go down, the market structure may look 
like monopolistic competition, where many small firms such as retail stores and 
restaurants are competing each other. However, when these two costs go up, the 
market structure may become oligopolistic. In other words, goods with low costs 
are sold by many mill pricing firms while goods with high costs are delivered by 
few price-discriminating firms. Thus, the cost structure determines the market 
structure. 
    The question iswhether these costs c and F increase or decrease over time. 
The technical progress in transportation reduces the transportation cost rate c. 
On the other, hand, recent endency of various deregulations would remove ntry 
barriers, and hence reduce the entry cost F. These two factors contribute to an 
increase in the number of firms n, and then the, dominance ofthe mill pricing 
strategy. However, F may tend to grow over time if increasing returns to scale in 
production and in sales are getting more important. Large R&D expenditure on 
sunk capital investments is an example. If this factor is stronger than the other 
two, then the market is occupied by few big firms taking the discriminatory 
pricing strategy. 
    Finally, it is observed from Figure 3 that here exist multiple quilibria 
when ape [ yvl, c3J. In such cases, initial conditions dictate which pricing 
equilibrium isrealized. To see this, let us examine two representative situations 
below.
Case I: qp is initially small and is increasing over time. 
   We know from Proposition 3(a) that initially the discriminatory pricing
14
prevails for a small value of gyp. However, as cp gets large and reaches V2, odd-
number firms change its strategy to mill pricing. And so, the discriminatory 
pricing is replaced by the MD pricing. When V exceeds Spa, even-number firms 
alter its strategy to mill pricing too. That is, the mill pricing equilibrium 
predominates. 
Case II: rp is initially large and is decreasing over time. 
    The parameter V changes in a reverse direction of Case II. From 
Proposition 3(d), for a large q each firm selects the mill pricing initially. Such a 
mill pricing equilibrium persists until cp reaches dpi. When cv becomes smaller 
than cpl, each firm changes its mill pricing strategy to the discriminatory one all at 
once.
    Comparing the two cases, we observe aso-called hysteresis nthat he 
spatial arrangements of pricings differ between the two directions when cpE (cpi, (
3) .4
6. Conclusion 
   We have analyzed a spatial oligopoly, where firms compete in location and 
in pricing strategy. Consumers are uniformly distributed over the unit-
circumference of a circle. Firms select heir location on the circumference of a 
circle in the first stage, and choose a pricing strategy in the second stage. Seeking 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, we have examined the sustainability of 
equilibrium. The following results were obtained. 
   First, firms tend to adopt the discriminatory pricing as a dominant strategy
4 It should be noted that other spatial arrangements such as the one in footnote 2 do not appear in 
these two cases. It means that when the parameter ~p changes monotonically, the spatial 
configuration is uniquely determined.
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so far as the marginal costs between the mill and discriminatory pricing strategies 
do not differ much. It is not only Pareto inferior for each firm, but also a market 
failure from a social welfare point of view. Second, whatever the pricing strategy 
is attained, the equilibrium number of firms is too large as compared to the social 
optimum one. Third, the mill pricing strategy may become prevalent in the future 
due to improvements in transportation technology and deregulations of market 
entry. Finally, we found multiple equilibria and a hysteresis in the spatial 
arrangements ofpricing strategies.
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Figure 3 Parameter Change and Spatial Arrangements of Pricing Strategies 
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